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 Abstract 
 
Several countries in eastern Europe may accede to the European Union in about two years 
time, making them candidates to join Europe’s single currency from 2006.  Some well-known 
economists have advocated that countries in eastern Europe adopt the  euro now either 
unilaterally or by prior arrangement with the EU.  Such official currency substitution is 
typically termed “dollarisation” or “euroisation”, and is the most extreme form of a hard peg 
currency regime.  This paper brings together perspectives from a conference “Dollarisation 
and Euroisation: Viable Policy Options?” held at the LSE in May 2002.  We discuss a 
number of issues associated with dollarisation or euroisation, including: the credibility of the 
monetary regime, the implications for domestic inflation, the importance of other 
macroeconomic policies, the reversibility of hard peg currency regimes, the outlook of the 
reserve currency issuer, and the broader context in which dollarisation or euroisation is 
pursued.  Finally, we address some particular issues associated with euroisation for EU 
accession countries.  Euroisation prior to EU accession may help to forestall a speculative 
attack, but it must be implemented in a way that is consistent with the Maastricht Treaty and 
does not impede progress toward EMU membership. 
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and Massimiliano Pisani*  
 
 
Some countries in eastern Europe may accede to the European Union in about two years time, 
making them candidates to adopt Europe’s single currency from 2006.  Unlike Great Britain, 
which must give prior approval to participation in the euro via a public referendum, countries 
in eastern Europe will not be able to opt out of monetary union.  The question facing them is 
when, not if. 
Several well-known economists - including Willem Buiter of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and Jacek Rostowski of Central European University, in 
remarks at a recent LSE conference - have advocated that countries in eastern Europe should 
adopt the euro now either unilaterally or by prior arrangement with the EU (this second 
option is often referred to as “consensual euroisation”).  In this case, the euro would circulate 
in parallel to the domestic currency, or perhaps replace it altogether.  In any event, this action 
would require authorities to fix the value of the domestic currency in terms of the euro, rather 
than participating in the ERM2 target band arrangement for two years before entering EMU. 1 
Euroisation is not particularly new.  It is a form of official currency substitution, in 
which a reserve currency replaces the domestic legal tender.  Economists generally regard 
official currency substitution as the “hardest” form of pegged exchange rate regime, one that 
is more difficult to reverse than a currency board.  Such official currency substitution has 
become known as “dollarisation,” even if the currency chosen to replace the domestic 
currency is the euro or some reserve currency other than the US dollar. 
                                                 
*  This article brings together perspectives from the conference “Dollarisation and Euroisation:  Viable Policy 
Options?” hosted by the LSE on May 24-25, 2002.  The conference programme and papers are available on: 
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/events/conferences/dollarization. 
1 The Maastricht Treaty requires participation in the exchange rate mechanism for two years prior to evaluation 
for entry into monetary union.  However, in the cases of Finland, Italy, and Greece, this requirement was 
interpreted flexibly.  Although these three countries participated in the ERM (or in its successor arrangement, 
ERM2) for a full two years prior to entry into monetary union, the evaluation of their compliance with the 
Treaty’s convergence criteria took place before the two-year mark. 
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Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City already use the euro as their 
domestic currency (the euro replaced the legacy currency that was already in use).  In eastern 
Europe, Kosovo and Montenegro also have euroised.  A number of other economies use an 
external currency for their legal tender (see Table 1).  From this table two striking facts 
emerge:  first, most of the economies “dollarised” many decades ago; and second, population 
in these economies is very small, ranging from 56 inhabitants on Pitcairn Island to 3.5 million 
in Puerto Rico!  Before the adoption of the dollar in Ecuador (population 12.9 million) and El 
Salvador (population 6.1 million) in 2000 and 2001, respectively, the average population in 
dollarising countries was 450,000.  Dollarising countries have traditionally been miniscule in 
economic terms, with strong trade ties to the reserve currency country and relatively 
undeveloped domestic financial markets.  In fact, size may an important determinant of 
success with respect to “dollarisation.”2  If this is the case, the debate in 1997 over 
dollarisation in Argentina, the recent adoption of the dollar in Ecuador and El Salvador, and 
the calls for adoption of the euro in transition to EU membership can be seen as 
fundamentally different in that these countries are all much larger than the traditional 
dollariser. 
A large academic and policy literature was written in the late 1990s motivated by 
proposals that Argentina should replace its then-successful currency board, which linked the 
peso one-to-one with the US dollar, with a dollarisation arrangement.  A primary focus in this 
literature was on the appropriate exchange rate arrangement when financial liabilities are 
denominated in a reserve currency while financial assets are denominated in the domestic 
currency.  Large “liability dollarisation” makes a country vulnerable to adverse balance sheet 
effects arising from changes in the exchange rate.  Liability dollarisation can be seen as 
reducing the range of values of the exchange rate that domestic authorities can tolerate.3  
Berg and Borensztein (2000) provide a good summary of the pros and cons of official 
currency substitution in the context of the Argentine debate. 
Mendoza (2002) sees the fundamental advantage of dollarisation in terms of 
“institutions substitution,” a process by which dollarising countries “borrow” the monetary 
policy institutions of the reserve currency country.  He regards dollarisation as superior to a 
currency board largely because, under dollarisation, the domestic central bank is “replaced” 
with the central bank of the reserve currency issuer. 
                                                 
2 Lars Jonung made this point in his discussion of Jeff Frieden’s conference presentation. 
3 Eduardo Levy Yeyati made this latter point in his conference presentation. 
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In the best circumstances, dollarisation eliminates currency risk and possibly reduces 
default risk.  The extent of these gains depends, of course, on how irreversible dollarisation is 
perceived to be.  Ideally, credibility gains from “institutions substitution” will substantially 
narrow the spread on dollar liabilities issued by the dollarising government relative to those 
issued by the US Treasury, producing lower domestic interest rates. 
The traditional optimal currency area theory of Mundell advocates fixing the nominal 
exchange rate between countries when there is a high degree of real integration as defined by 
a strong trading relationship, exposure to common shocks, and highly mobile labor and 
capital.  Thus, the focus in the dollarisation literature on financial linkages and the role of 
credibility and reputation in the choice of a monetary regime provides a different rationale for 
sharing a common currency.  Buiter has suggested this approach sets out a “new” theory of 
optimal currency areas. 
Key to successful dollarisation, however, is that other economic policies must be 
appropriate.  In particular, dollarisation is a commitment by the monetary authority only and 
does not guarantee a responsible fiscal policy.  Over the short-term, a lax fiscal policy will 
erode the credibility gain from dollarisation by putting upward pressure on domestic interest 
rates.  Over the longer term, excessive deficits may undermine the monetary regime itself, by 
raising the incentive to monetize government debt.  For example, credibility gains from 
Argentina’s currency board were high in the early years following its adoption in 1991, but 
eroded over time as the government failed to consolidate its fiscal policy.  In a recent 
monograph, Mussa (2002) provides an interesting discussion of Argentina’s downfall. 
Several econometric studies have shown that hard pegs lead to better inflation 
performance.  Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2002) find that, keeping other factors constant, 
inflation is 10.5 percentage points per year lower under a hard peg4 than under a floating 
exchange rate.  Of these 10.5 percentage points, 4.5 percentage points derive from lower 
money growth in the pegged regime (the “discipline effect”), while the remaining 5.5 
percentage points represent the credibility gain associated with the hard peg regime (the 
“confidence effect”).  As the methodology makes no distinction between pegs maintained for 
a series of years and a series of pegs sustained for a single year, the authors are not able to 
say anything about whether the discipline or confidence effects associated with the peg 
diminish over time.5 
                                                 
4 Hard peg regimes include currency boards in addition to dollarisation. 
5 Peter Kenen made this point in his discussion of Holger Wolf’s conference presentation. 
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The literature on dollarisation generally does not distinguish between cases where it is 
pursued in isolation, or is part of a broader integration agenda with the country that issues the 
reserve currency.  In practice, there is more than one way to dollarise or euroise.  During the 
1997 debate, Argentina’s central bank president Pedro Pou regarded dollarisation not as one 
single policy choice but as a range of policy options from unilateral to full monetary union.6  
With unilateral dollarisation or euroisation, the country adopting the reserve currency asks 
nothing of the issuer, whereas broader forms of dollarisation or euroisation involve some set 
of on-going obligations for the issuer of the reserve currency and thus require mutual 
agreement by the two countries to a treaty or bilateral arrangement. 
Argentina’s flirtation with dollarisation in 1997 stood in the context of a monetary 
treaty with the United States that would have provided for some sharing of seignorage 
revenue to fund a lender-of- last-resort facility.  The most cooperative form of arrangement is 
a monetary union such as the euro area, in which participating countries share a currency and 
decision-making power. 
Dollarisation and euroisation raise important issues about the degree of responsibility 
or commitment of the currency issuer towards the adopting country.  When the policy is not 
unilateral, the issuer has some stake in the success (although the degree of this stake depends 
on the exact requirements of the arrangement).  The commitment of the issuer can also serve 
to “bind in” the dollarising or euroising country, particularly if this commitment involves 
several steps that will lead ultimately to further integration between the two countries.  Thus, 
dollarisation in Ecuador, which was a unilateral undertaking in response to an economic and 
financial crisis, differs from dollarisation in El Salvador, which was part of a broader trade 
and integration strategy with the United States.  And euroisation in Andorra, Monaco, San 
Marino, and Vatican City differs fundamentally from potential euroisation in EU accession 
countries because the latter countries seek eventually to join monetary union and participate 
fully in the monetary policy decision making of the European Central Bank.7 
Caroline Atkinson has stressed that debates over dollarisation often ignore the 
perspective of the reserve currency issuer.  In the Argentine case, US authorities opposed a 
monetary treaty for fear that it would ultimately impose broader responsibilities, or at least 
generate a perception that the US was playing a role in the supervision of Argentine banks, 
acting as lender of last resort, and taking the Argentine economy into account when setting 
US interest rates.  Argentina’s proposed monetary treaty, in fact, provided only for the US to 
                                                 
6 Andrew Powell made this point at the conference. 
7 Christian Thimann made this point at the conference.   
 5 
share in seignorage revenue and did not involve broader obligations.  Despite that, the view 
of US authorities was that any treaty, no matter how narrow in scope, was a political symbol 
that could serve to create obligations for the currency issuer in times of crisis.  The current 
opposition of European policy officials to euroisation in EU accession countries could owe to 
the fear that European authorities would be held accountable in times of financial turmoil, 
even for the results of unilateral decisions.  Both US and European authorities recognize that 
dollarisation or euroisation is part of a broader set of policies - in the US case, officials 
implicitly discourage dollarisation because they do not want any policy linkage with the 
adopting country, whereas in the European case, officials discourage early euroisation 
because they want only the full linkage that will be provided by monetary union. 
If dollarisation is to provide major credibility gains, it must be widely viewed as 
irreversible, as an irrevocable commitment to replace the domestic legal tender with the 
reserve currency.  However, the reversal of dollarisation is not particularly difficult to 
implement.  For instance, Liberia de-dollarised in 1998 after 54 years using the US dollar as a 
parallel domestic currency.  In Argentina, to take another example, the number of parallel 
currencies in circulation increased dramatically as its recent crisis deepened and the country 
abandoned its currency board (see Table 2).  Thus, linking the currency decision to a broader 
integration strategy can help to make dollarisation appear less reversible and enhance its 
credibility.8 
Buiter and Grafe (2002) and Bratkowski and Rostowski (2002) have advocated early 
euroisation in accession countries as an interim exchange rate arrangement during the 
transition to EMU.  A target band system, they argue, is crisis-prone and euroisation would 
be the best regime to forestall a speculative attack.  European officials do not see the ERM2 
as crisis-prone, because of the wide bands around the central rate.  (However, Truman, 2002, 
argues that target band arrangements are vulnerable to speculative attack, and that the 1992 
crisis in the ERM which led to the ejection of the pound and the eventual widening of the 
intervention bands was the first of the international financial crises during that decade.)  At 
this point, financial markets are betting that the candidate countries will join the EU, so the 
credibility gains associated with a move to euroisation would be limited.9  However, 
euroisation might be helpful in limiting financial market speculation in the event of a long 
and unexpected delay in the accession process. 
                                                 
8 David Stasavage emphasized the reversibility of dollarisation in his discussion of Levy Yeyati’s conference 
presentation. 
9 Michael Marrese made this point in his conference presentation. 
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According to the Maastricht Treaty, the Council of Ministers must approve the rate of 
conversion into the euro.  That requirement would appear to rule out unilateral euroisation, in 
which an accession country would select its own conversion rate.  However, Buiter and Grafe 
contend, there are two Treaty-consistent options:  (1) joint selection by the Council and the 
accession country of the rate at which the domestic legal tender is converted into euros (so-
called “consensual” euroisation); or (2) a currency board arrangement in which the euro is 
legalized as a parallel currency for use alongside the domestic currency of the accession 
country.  Either way, such use of the euro in the run-up to accession would appear to make 
some sense as a transition measure to discourage speculation, so long as it is implemented in 
the context of sound macroeconomic policies and is not in clear violation of the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
An important aspect of fixing the nominal exchange rate prior to EMU entry is that 
the Maastricht Treaty inflation criterion will become more difficult to achieve.  More rapid 
productivity growth in the traded goods sector in accession countries (relative to countries in 
the euro area) will lead to real exchange rate appreciation – the so-called Belassa Samuelson 
effect.  If the nominal exchange rate is fixed through consensual euroisation or a currency 
board, then real appreciation arises through more rapid inflation in the accession countries 
relative to the euro area.  Studies suggest that annual inflation in accession countries may be 
boosted by 1 to 3-1/2 percent owing to Belassa-Samuelson effects.  Rostowski has 
commented that, in order to achieve the Treaty’s inflation criterion, accession countries will 
need to experience a brief recession.  Others are betting that the Treaty’s inflation criterion 
will be adjusted to take account of Belassa-Samuelson effects.  Such an adjustment could be 
made in the Acquis Communautaire that sets out the terms of accession for each accession 
country. 
Interestingly, a discussion about the pre-designation of conversion rates arises in the 
context of a UK referendum on the euro.  Richard Layard of the CEP and others claim that a 
referendum would need to specify the rate of the pound’s conversion into the euro.  This 
would appear to require the British government to pre-negotiate the pound’s conversion rate 
with the Council of Ministers.  In the British case, there is no interest in fixing the pound in a 
currency board or through euroisation before EMU entry.  Rather, specification of an entry 
rate is intended to allay fears of overvaluation.  Obviously, any prior negotiation of a 
conversion rate - either for accession countries or the UK - would set an important precedent. 
7 
Table 1 
Economies Using Another Currency as Domestic Legal Tender 
 
Country Population Political Status  Currency used Since 
     
Andorra 63,000 Independent Euro (Frenc franc and 
Spanish peseta since 1278) 
1999 
Channel Islands 140,000 British dependencies pound sterling 1797 
Cocos Islands 600 Australian external territory Australian dollar 1955 
Cyprus, Northern 180,000 de facto independent Turkish lira 1974 
Greenland 56,000 Danish self-governing region Danish krone Before 1800 
Guam 150,000 U.S. territory U.S. dollar 1898 
Kiribati 80,000 Independent Australian dollar 1943 
Liechtenstein 31,000 Independent Swiss franc 1921 
Marshall Islands 60,000 Independent U.S. dollar 1944 
Micronesia 120,000 Independent U.S. dollar 1944 
Monaco 30,000 Independent Euro (French franc since 
1865) 
1999 
Nauru 8,000 Independent Australian dollar 1914 
Niue 2,000 New Zealand self-governing 
Territory 
New Zealand dollar 1901 
Norfolk Island 2,000 Australian external territory Australian dollar Before 1900 
Northern Mariana Islands 48,000 U.S. commonwealth U.S. dollar 1944 
Palau 18,000 Independent U.S. dollar 1944 
Panama 2.5 m. Independent 1 balboa = 1 US $; uses dollar 
notes  
1904 
Pitcairn Island 56 British dependency New Zealand and US. dollars 1800s 
Puerto Rico 3.5 m. U.S. commonwealth U.S. dollar 1899 
Saint Helena 6,000 British colony pound sterling 1834 
Samoa, American 60,000 U.S. territory U.S. dollar 1899 
San Marino 24,000 Independent Euro (Italian lira since 1897) 1999 
Tokelau 1,600 New Zealand territory New Zealand dollar 1926 
Turks and Caicos Islands 14,000 British colony U.S. dollar 1973 
Tuvalu 10,000 Independent Australian dollar 1892 
Vatican City 1,000 Independent Euro (Italian lira since 1929) 1999 
Virgin Islands, British 17,000 British dependency U.S. dollar 1973 
Virgin Islands, U.S. 100,000 U.S. territory U.S. dollar 1917 
 
 
Ecuador 12.9 m.
 
Independent 
 
U.S. dollar 
 
2000 
El Salvador 
 
6.1 m. Independent 
 
U.S. dollar 
 
2001 
 
Kosovo  Euro  
Montenegro  Euro  
 
Source:  Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002).  
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Table 2 
Argentina's Quasi-Monies in Circulation 
(Millions of Argentine pesos) 
 
 Denomination December 2001 March 2002 
 
Federal government 
 
 
Lecop 
 
1,039 
 
2,649 
 
Provincial “own” securities  1,627 2,591 
 
1. Buenos Aires Patacones 822 1,591 
2. Buenos Aires, City Porteno -- -- 
3. Catamarca Ley 4748 26 31 
4. Chaco Quebracho 50 100 
5. Cordoba Lecor 200 300 
6. Corrientes Cecaror 193 185 
7. Entre Rios Bonfe 54 148 
8. Formosa Bocanfor 33 50 
9. Jujuy Patacon -- 6 
10. Mendoza Petrom -- -- 
11. La Rioja  Debt Cancelation 8 8 
12. Tucuman 
 
Bocade 98 173 
Quasi-monies:    
Total  2,666 5,240 
As percent of pesos in circulation  23.2 45.6 
 
Source:  De la Torre, Levy Yeyati, and Schmukler (2002). 
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